by Stephen Bryen
It would make sense to keep the A-10 for warfighting because it is the best platform for that purpose. As a flying high powered gun system it is just what is needed against massed threats from “big” or well-equipped enemies, providing it is used with the other aircraft and missile systems in the US inventory.
The A-10 is a ground attack aircraft that the Air Force would dearly like to get rid of if they could. But Congress has kept the A-10 program alive mostly because the A-10 has many stubborn advocates who believe in the plane. But now, even as it is being again deployed to Afghanistan after a three year hiatus, the survival of the plane is in doubt: roughly one third of the entire fleet of A-10’s needs new wings to keep flying, but there is no plan or money to manufacture and install new wings for these planes and the Air Force only has money in its budget to re-wing four aircraft. But it isn’t cost effective to build wings for only four planes, meaning that none of them will be repaired. Many experts think that the 110 A-10’s that lack reinforced wings will end up in the scrap heap. This will leave a fleet of 170 aircraft that have been upgraded with improved wings: but if the US keeps using the A-10’s heavily against terrorists in places such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria it won’t be long before even the remaining 170 are ground down. Altogether if things stay as they are, and depending on the pace of combat, the A-10 will soon become an historical memory.
Is it in America’s national interest to keep the A-10? Or has the A-10 truly become obsolete?
By Senior Airman Matthew Bruch – https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1173912/fearsome-four-ship-188th-warthogs-train-razorback-range, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=56208988
Originally the A-10 was designed as a tank “buster” that was to be used should the Soviet Union launch an invasion of Western Europe. Right from the start the A-10 had its critics because by the 1970’s the Soviets had an order of battle that included moving mobile air defense missiles and guns along with army divisions. Mobile air defenses are a Soviet –Russian– specialty. While the Improved Hawk and the Patriot have some mobility, they are more difficult air defense systems to move and are not protected by rapid fire gunnery systems. During the 1973 Yom Kippur war, the Egyptians moved SA-6 mobile missile batteries and accompanying ZSU Quad-4 23mm rapid fire anti-aircraft guns forward in the Sinai. Israel attacked these missile-gun sites vigorously because without their liquidation Israel could not make use of its air power in the Sinai battle. The affair was a very costly one: Israeli A-4’s suffered heavy losses and damage, many of them struggling to return to base with their tails shot up, mainly by the ZSU rapid fire gun systems. The vulnerability was not when the Israeli fighters swooped in on the target, but when they pulled away. As any pilot knows, when you are trying to rapidly gain altitude pulling away from a target, you lose a lot of energy and speed. This is when the enemy has his best shot at you, and in this the Egyptians did very well.
One can imagine that if there was a Soviet attack in Europe, say approaching the Fulda Gap, identical tactics would be used. In fact, the only thing that has changed is that Russian air defenses have evolved and become more sophisticated and capable, giving them greater potential against US and NATO air assets.
The Air Force is saying that the A-10 is not suitable to such “complex” and sophisticated air defense environments and is only useful in lower level conflicts where the adversary has limited air defense capabilities and no air force.
Is this true? While a case could be made that the A-10 should at least be kept for actions where the enemies capabilities are limited, the spread of Russian air defense systems and the sale of modern fighter aircraft to third countries would appear to limit the usefulness of the A-10 following the Air Force’s criteria.
The positives about the A-10 are, first and most importantly its massive and tremendously effective GAU-8 30mm rotary canon gun that can tear up hard and soft enemy assets and totally intimidate a terrorist force, and its self-protection system including a well-armored cockpit and self-sealing foamed fuel tanks. The placement of the A-10’s two engines high on the aircraft also makes it more difficult to use shoulder-fired missiles against the A-10 as the engine placement helps shroud its infrared heat signature.
The single biggest negative is that the A-10 needs to be close to its target to use its gun making it not really different from the F-15, the F-16 or the F-18 or for that matter from the F-35 stealth fighter. The big difference is the A-10 is far more lethal when it strikes a target than the others. Because the A-10 will always in a complex environment be working with the other Air Force assets such as the F-16, it can still play a role against all targets providing the other aircraft can liquidate most of the air defense threat.
The case for the F-35, a stealthy plane replacing everything that came before it, including the A-10 is propaganda, not reality. The F-35 is very limited in the number of weapons it can carry and is primarily an air dominance platform, not at all optimized for ground attack. The complex of ideas behind the F-35 is primarily to leverage its stealth capability and be able to penetrate enemy air defenses before the enemy “sees” the F-35. Right now that still seems a valid idea, but like every technology stealth has a half life or worse and the utility of technology is on a downward slope as potential adversaries also are developing stealth platforms that can challenge the F-35 and radars and other sensors that can “see” the F-35 (and for that matter the F-22 as well). Assuming everything works (a foolish assumption when it comes to combat scenarios), the F-35 can suppress the S-400 and S-500 air defense systems of an enemy and take out the enemy air force. If it does not work as well as planned, the Air Force will be ineffective and the enemy will dominate the skies.
As noted, the A-10 still has a strong role to play even if the F-35 works as advertised. Consider a battle with North Korea (which does not have the latest air defense systems). The A-10 would be a great platform to knock out North Korean tanks and dug-in artillery, which is the main battle arm North Korea will use in any war. The A-10 could carve up North Korean divisions, make it increasingly immobile and blast away at massed forces. With F-35s, F-15s and F-16s hovering overhead and B-1 bombers supporting a counterattack, the North Korean military could be smashed up so quickly that it might disintegrate on the spot.
The A-10 could carve up North Korean divisions, make it increasingly immobile and blast away at massed forces. With F-35s, F-15s and F-16s hovering overhead and B-1 bombers supporting a counterattack, the North Korean military could be smashed up so quickly that it might disintegrate on the spot.
It would make sense to keep the A-10 for warfighting because it is the best platform for that purpose. As a flying high powered gun system it is just what is needed against massed threats from “big” or well-equipped enemies, providing it is used with the other aircraft and missile systems in the US inventory.
Congress should appropriate the funds needed to repair the A-10’s that need new wings and make overall improvements in the A-10 fleet to keep them on the job in full force. They are not ready for the junkyard and won’t be for many decades.
